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Abstract. In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma.
First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always
nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games
where both the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show
that the problem of nding a stable allocation, given a nitely generated NTU-game
with capacities, is always solvable by the Scarf's Lemma. Then we consider an even
more general setting where players' contributions in a joint activity may be dierent.
We show that a stable allocation can be found by the Scarf algorithm in this case
as well. Finally we describe the interpretation of these results for stable matching
problems, and in particular, for the hospitals resident problem with couples.
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1 Introduction
Complex social and economic situations can be described as games where the players
may cooperate with each other. Most studies in cooperative game theory focus on the
issue of how the participants form disjoint coalitions, and sometimes also on the way the
members of coalitions share the utilities of their cooperations among themselves (in case
of games with transferable utility). However, in reality, an agent in the market (or any
individual in some social situation) may be involved in more than one cooperation at a
time, moreover, a cooperation may be performed with dierent intensities. For instance,
an employer can have several employees and their working hours can be dierent (but
within some reasonable limits). In this case we may assume that a part-time contract
has the same terms as a full-time contract, only the working hours and the salary (and
other duties and benets) are set proportionally. Finally, a cooperation might require
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dierent contributions from dierent players. As an example, consider the coalition of a
PhD student and her supervisor. The student is very likely to spend all of her working
ours (say 40h per week) on this project, whilst the supervisor might spend 3 hours with
this student a week.
Scarf [40] proved that every balanced NTU-game (i.e, cooperative game with non-
transferable utilities) has a nonempty core. Informally, a solution is in the core of an
NTU-game (or it is stable) if there is no deviating coalition whose members could all get
strictly better o by forming a new cooperation among themselves. Scarf's theorem was
based on a lemma, which became known as the Scarf Lemma, that constructively proved
the existence of a fractional solution for any NTU-game. If a game is balanced then this
fractional solution is guaranteed to be integral and thus equivalent to a core element, he
showed.
The essence of our paper is to describe the notion of fractional stable solutions in a
variety of NTU-games, starting from simple coalition formation games to a rather com-
plicated model where players have capacities and the cooperations can be performed with
dierent contributions by the players. Surprisingly, the original Scarf Lemma implies the
existence of a stable fractional solutions in all cases, and it can be computed by Scarf's
original algorithm. We show that we may use these fractional solutions in practical appli-
cations as well, such as the resident allocation problem with couples, where the integral
stable solutions correspond to stable matchings. The Scarf algorithm can therefore serve
as a heuristic to solve dicult (sometimes NP-hard) stable matching or coalition formation
problems, just like as an integer program can be tackled by solving its LP relaxation. Our
new models, where the players contribute dierently in coalitions, may also provide new
descriptions of further economic or social applications. For instance, in some countries
(e.g. Hungary, France and Portugal) the research grant applications must contain the con-
tributions of the participants in the proposed projects in terms of their devoted working
time, just like in our most general model, the stable schedule problem.
In this paper, we give a new interpretation of the fractional solutions which are obtained
by the Scarf algorithm for dierent settings. First we consider the original setting of the
Lemma for nitely generated NTU-games, and we describe the meaning of the output in
terms of fractional core. We show the correspondence between this notion and the concept
of fractional stable matchings for hypergraphs. We conclude Section 2 by explaining how
the normality of a hypergraph implies the nonemptiness of the core for the corresponding
NTU-games. In Section 3, we dene the stable allocation problem for hypergraphs, which
corresponds to the problem of nding a fractional core for NTU-games where the players
can be involved in more than one coalition and the joint activities can be performed at
dierent intensity levels (up to some capacity constrains). We show that, by an appropriate
extension of the Scarf Lemma implies the existence of the latter solution. Then, we
consider an even more general setting where the contributions of the players may dier
in an activity, called stable allocation problem with contributions, or stable schedules. We
show that the Scarf algorithm can nd a stable allocation for this case as well. In Section
4, we apply these results for matching problems and we derive some well-known theorems
in this context. We also illustrate the usage of Scarf algorithm as a heuristic for the
hospitals residents problem with couples (the complete description of this experiment can
be found in our follow-up paper [10]). Finally, in Section 5, we present some important
open problems and new research directions.
Related literature
The notion of a fractional core can be easily dened by the seminal paper of Scarf [40].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are not many papers on this notion. Aharoni
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and Fleiner [1] described the connection between the fractional core element and fractional
stable matchings for the roommates problem and for coalition formation games as well.
Besides other results, they demonstrated how the Scarf Lemma implies the existence
of stable half-integral solutions for the stable roommates problem, a theorem originally
proved by Tan [43].
Stable matching problems have been extensively studied in the last half century, since
the paper by Gale and Shapley [22] has been published, by economists (see e.g. [38]),
computer scientists (see e.g. [23]), and in other disciplines as well.1 The main reason of the
increased attention on this subject is the large number of important practical applications.
Perhaps the earliest centralised matching scheme is the US resident allocation program,
called NRMP, where the Gale-Shapley algorithm has been in operation since 1952. One
of the special features of this program (and its counterparts in other countries, such as
in Scotland [47]) is that couples may submit joint applications for pair of positions. This
feature makes the problem challenging to solve both in theory and practice (see more in
a recent survey on this problem [12]). At the end of our paper we illustrate how the Scarf
algorithm can be used as a heuristic to solve this problem.
We are not aware of any paper on NTU-games where both the players and their
cooperations have capacities, apart from the papers on the stable allocation problem for
matching markets ([5], [2], [8] and [20]). However, there is a closely related paper to
ours on TU-games with overlapping coalitions [16]. In the latter paper the general model
introduced is essentially the TU version of our stable allocation problem with contributions
(or stable schedules), that we study in Section 4. So our last problem can be seen as the
extension of their TU-model for NTU-games.
Our contribution
The main contribution of our paper is that we extend the result of Scarf and show the
existence of a fractional stable solution for NTU-games with capacities (Theorem 12) and
NTU-games with contributions (Theorem 13). We also give alternative proofs for known
theorems. We show that whenever the basic coalitions of a NTU-game form a normal
hypergraph then the core is nonempty, originally proved by Vasin and Gurvich [44], and by
Kaneko and Wooders [26] (Theorem 10). For bipartite matching games this boils down to
the result of Kaneko [25], Crawford-Knoer [17] (Theorem 15). For non-bipartite matching
games we obtain a slight generalisation of Tan's [43] theorem, namely the existence of
a stable half-matching2. For nonbipartite capacitated matching games we retrieve the
result of Biro and Fleiner [8] on the existence of half-integral stable allocations (Theorem
18), which implies the existence of an integral stable allocation for bipartite graphs, a
theorem of Baou and Balinski [5]. Finally, we demonstrate with examples that nding
stable fractional solutions can be done eciently by the Scarf algorithm for settings that
are coming from real applications, such as the matching with couples problem, and thus
this approach can serve as a new heuristic to provide fair solutions in centrally coordinated
markets.
1The 2012 Nobel-Prize in Economic Sciences has been awarded to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley for
the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.
2Note that very recently Alkan and Tuncay [3] showed similar results for non-bipartite matching games.
They proved the existence of stable half-matching (under the name of semistable allocations) for a special
case where the Pareto-frontier of the utility spaces are continuous decreasing functions.
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2 Fractional core - fractional stable matchings
In this section, rst we describe the Scarf Lemma and we give a new interpretation of the
fractional results obtained by the Scarf algorithm.
2.1 Denitions, preliminaries
We recall the denition of n-person games with nontransferable utility (NTU-game for
short).
Denition 1 An NTU-game is given by a pair (N;V ), where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the set
of players and V is a mapping of a set of feasible utility vectors, a subset V (S) of RS to
each coalition of players, S  N , such that V (;) = ;, and for all S  N , S 6= ;:
a) V (S) is a closed subset of RS
b) V (S) is comprehensive, i.e. if uS 2 V (S) and ~uS  uS then ~uS 2 V (S)
c) The set of vectors in V (S) in which each player in S receives no less than the maximum
that he can obtain by himself is a nonempty, bounded set.
One of the most important solution concepts is the core.
Denition 2 A utility vector uN 2 V (N) is in the core of the game, if there exists no
coalition S  N with a feasible utility vector ~uS 2 V (S) such that uNi < ~uSi for every
player i 2 S. Such a coalition is called blocking coalition.
An NTU-game (N;V ) is superadditive if V (S)  V (T )  V (S [ T ) for every pair of
disjoint coalitions S and T . In what follows, we restrict our attention to superadditive
games.
Partitioning games are special superadditive games. Given a set of basic coalitions
B  2N , that contain all singletons (i.e. every single player has the right not to cooperate
with the others), a partitioning game (N;V;B) is dened as follows: if B(S) denotes the
set of partitions of S into basic coalitions, then V (S) can be generated as:
V (S) = fuS 2 RS j9 = fB1; B2; : : : ; Bkg 2 B(S) : uS 2 V (B1) V (B2)     V (Bk)g
This means that uS is a feasible utility vector of S if there exist a partition  of S into
basic coalitions such that each utility vector uS jBi can be obtained as a feasible utility
vector by basic coalition Bi in .
Given an NTU-game (N;V ), let U(S) be the set of Pareto optimal utility vectors of
the coalition S, i.e. uS 2 U(S) if there exists no ~uS 2 V (S), where uS 6= ~uS and uS  ~uS .
A utility vector uS 2 V (S) is separable if there exist a proper partition  of S into
subcoalitions S1; S2; : : : ; Sk such that u
S jSi is in V (Si) for every Si 2 . A utility vector
that is non-separable, Pareto-optimal and in which each player receives no less than the
maximum that he can obtain by himself is called an ecient vector. A coalition S is es-
sential if V (S) contains an ecient utility vector. In other words, a coalition S is essential,
if its members can obtain an ecient utility vector that is not achievable independently
by its subcoalitions. The set of essential coalitions is denoted by E(N;V ).
We say that a coalition S is not relevant if for every utility vector uS 2 V (S) there
exists a proper subcoalition T  S such that uS jT is in V (T ). The set of relevant coalitions
is denoted by R(N;V ). The idea behind this notion is that if a non-relevant coalition S
is blocking with a utility vector uS , then one of its subcoalitions, say T1, must be also
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blocking with utility vector uT1 = uS jT1 . Moreover, if T1 is not relevant or uT1 is separable,
then we can nd another coalition T2  T1, such that uT2 = uT1 jT2 = uS jT2 , an so on.
Continuing this argument, it is clear that there must be a relevant coalition Ti  S, that is
blocking with a non-separable vector uTi = uS jTi . This observation implies the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3 A utility vector uN 2 V (N) is in the core if and only if it is not blocked
by any relevant coalition with an ecient utility vector.
Obviously, if a coalition is not essential, then it cannot be relevant either. In a par-
titioning game, the set of essential coalitions must be a subset of the basic coalitions by
denition.
Proposition 4 For every partitioning game (N;V;B), R(N;V;B)  E(N;V;B)  B
holds.
Scarf [40] observed that the previously introduced notions are purely ordinal in charac-
ter: they are invariant under a continuous monotonic transformation of the utility function
of any individual. Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume that Ufig = f0g for
every singleton, and all the ecient utility vectors are nonnegative. Moreover, the dis-
cussion can be carried out on an abstract level with the outcomes for each individual
represented by arbitrary ordered sets, as we describe this in detail below.
Suppose that in order to obtain a particular non-separable vector uS;k in U(S), the
members of S have to perform a joint activity, say aS;k. Let AS denote the set of activities
that yield ecient utility vectors in U(S). The preference of a player over the possible
activities in which he can be involved is determined by the utilities that he obtains in
these activities. Formally, we suppose that aS;k i aT;l () uS;ki  uT;li for any pair of
activities aS;k and aT;l, where i 2 S and i 2 T .
Considering an ecient utility vector uN;l of the grandcoalition N , the non-separability
implies that uN;l corresponds to a joint activity aN;l of the entire set of players. Otherwise,
if uN;l is separable, then uN;l can be obtained as a direct sum of independent ecient utility
vectors of essential subcoalitions that form a partition of the grandcoalition. This can be
considered as a set of independent activities of the subcoalitions. An outcome of the game,
denoted by X then can be regarded as a partition  of the players and a set of activities
A performed independently by the coalitions in , so let X = (;A). An outcome
X is judged by a player i according to the activity he is involved in, denoted by ai(X).
An outcome is in the core of the game, or in other words, it is stable if there exist no
blocking coalition S with an activity aS;k that is strictly preferred by all of its members,
i.e., aS;k >i ai(X) for every i 2 S. (This is equivalent to the blocking condition uN;li < ~uSi ,
if the outcome X corresponds to the utility vector uN;l.)
An NTU-game is nitely generated if for every essential coalition S, U(S) contains a
nite number of vectors. Here, the preference order of a player over the set of activities, in
which he can be involved, can be represented by preference lists. As Scarf observed in [40]
and [41], a general NTU-game can be approximated by a nitely generated NTU-game
(see an illustration in Figure 1). In this paper, for simplicity, we state all our theorems
for nitely generated games. However, we shall note that our results imply the existence
of -stable (fractional) solutions (similarly dened as the -core, see e.g. Wooders [45]) for
any positive . Therefore our results are essentially valid without the assumption of the
NTU-game being nitely generated.
If for every essential coalition S, in a given NTU-game, U(S) contains only one single
vector, uS , then an outcome of the game is simply a partition, since each essential coalition
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uS;1
uS;2
uS;3
uS;4
uS;k
Figure 1: Approximation with nite number of ecient utility vectors.
has only one activity to perform. So here, instead of activities, each player has a preference
order over the essential coalitions in which he can be a member. These games are called
(hedonic) coalition formation games (cfg for short) [7] and [14], and an outcome that is
in the core of the game is called a core-partition. The following example illustrates a cfg.
Example 1.
Suppose that we are given 6 players: A;B;C;D;E and F , and 4 possible basic coalitions
with corresponding joint activities. The rst activity, b (bridge) can be played by A;B;C
and D, the second one, p (poker) can be played by C;D and E. Finally, B can play chess
with C (denoted by c1) and D can play chess with F (denoted by c2). The preferences of
the players over the joint activities are as follows.
D
A
B
C
E
F
Activities Participants Players Preference lists
b : fA;B;C;Dg B : b c1
p : fC;D;Eg C : p b c1
c1 : fB;Cg D : b p c2
c2 : fD;Fg
Here, fp; fAg; fBg; fFgg is a core-partition, since b is not blocking because C prefers
his present coalition p to b, similarly, c1 is not blocking because C prefers playing poker
with D and E to playing chess with B, and c2 is not blocking because D also prefers
playing poker to playing chess with F . One can easily check that fb; fEg; fFgg is also
a core-partition, but the partition fc1; c2; fAg; fEgg is not in the core, since p and b are
both blocking coalitions.
2.2 Fractional core by Scarf's Lemma
First, we present Scarf's Lemma [40] and then we introduce the notion of fractional core.
The following description of the Lemma is due to Aharoni and Fleiner [1] (here [n] denotes
the set of integers 1; 2; : : : ; n, and i;j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise).
Theorem 5 (Scarf [40]) Let n;m be positive integers, and b be a vector in Rn+. Also
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let A = (ai;j); C = (ci;j) be matrices of dimension n  (n + m), satisfying the following
three properties: the rst n columns of A form an n  n identity matrix (i.e. ai;j = i;j
for i; j 2 [n]), the set fx 2 Rn+m+ : Ax = bg is bounded, and ci;i < ci;k < ci;j for any
i 2 [n]; i 6= j 2 [n] and k 2 [n+m] n [n].
Then there is a nonnegative vector x in Rn+m+ such that Ax = b and the columns of
C that correspond to supp(x) form a dominating set, that is, for any column i 2 [n+m]
there is a row k 2 [n] of C such that ck;i  ck;j for any j 2 supp(x).
Let the columns of A and C correspond to the ecient utility vectors (or equivalently
to some activities) of the essential coalitions in a nitely generated NTU-game as follows.
If the k-th columns of A and C correspond to the utility vector uS;l, then let ai;k be 1 if
i 2 S and 0 otherwise, (so the k-th column of A is the membership vector of coalition S).
Furthermore, let ci;k = u
S;l
i if i 2 S and ci;k =M otherwise, whereM is a suciently large
number. We set ci;i = u
fig
i = 0 and ci;j = 2M if i 6= j  n. Finally, let b = 1N , which
implies that a solution x satisfying Ax = b is a so-called balanced collection of coalitions.
By applying Scarf's Lemma for this setting, we obtain a solution x that we call a fractional
core element of the game. We refer to the set of fractional core elements as the fractional
core of the game.
What is the meaning of a fractional core element? Let us suppose rst, that a fractional
core element x is integer, so xi 2 f0; 1g for all i. In this case we show that x gives a utility
vector uN that is in the core of the game. Let uN be the utility vector of N received by
summing up those independent essential utility vectors for which x(uS;k) = 1, then uN is
in V (N) by superadditivity. To prove that uN must be in the core of the game, let uS;k
be an essential utility vector, with x(uS;k) = 0. By the statement of Scarf's Lemma, there
must be a player i and an essential utility vector uT;l, such that i 2 T , x(uT;l) = 1 and
uS;ki  uT;li , so S cannot be a blocking coalition with the ecient utility vector uS;k.
In other words, the Ax = 1N condition of the solution says that x represents a partition
 of N and a set of activities A that are performed. (We say that aS;k is performed if
x(uS;k) = 1, i.e. aS;k 2 A, where that S is a coalition in partition ). Let X = (;A)
be the corresponding outcome, and let aS;k be an activity not performed, (i.e. aS;k =2 A).
Then, by Scarf's Lemma there must be a player i of S for which the performed activity,
ai(X) he is involved in is not worse than a
S;k, i.e., aS;k i ai(X), thus S cannot be a
blocking coalition with activity aS;k.
In the non-integer case, we shall regard x(uS;k) as the intensity at which the activ-
ity aS;k is performed by coalition S. The Ax = 1N condition means that each player
participates in activities with total intensity 1, including maybe the activity that this
player performs alone. The domination condition says that for each activity, which is not
performed with intensity 1, there exists a member of the coalition who is not interested
in increasing the intensity of this activity, since he is satised by some other preferred
activities that ll his remaining capacity. Formally, if x(uS;k) < 1 then there must be a
player i in S such that
P
aT;liaS;k x(u
T;l) = 1.
In Example 1, x(p) = 13 , x(b) =
2
3 is a fractional core element, since for each activity
there is at least one player who is not interested in increasing the intensity of that activity.
We illustrate with the following example that the fractional core of a game may admit a
unique fractional core element where the intensities of certain activities can be arbitrary
small nonnegative values.
Example 2.
In this example we have 6 players with 6 possible joint activities and the following prefer-
ences:
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AB C
D
E
F
Activities Participants Preference lists
p1 : fA;D;Bg A : p1 p3
p2 : fB;E;Cg B : p2 p1
p3 : fC;F;Ag C : p3 p2
c1 : fD;Eg D : p1 c1 c2
c2 : fE;Fg E : p2 c2 c3
c3 : fF;Dg F : p3 c3 c1
It can be veried that the only fractional core element here is x, where x(p1) = x(p2) =
x(p3) =
1
2 and x(c1) = x(c2) = x(c3) =
1
4 . One can easily extend this construction for 3n
players, where some activities in the unique fractional core element have intensity 2 n.
2.3 Fractional stable matching for hypergraphs
For a nitely generated NTU-game, the problem of nding a stable outcome is equivalent
to the stable matching problem (sm for short) for a hypergraph, as dened by Aharoni
and Fleiner [1]. Here, the vertices of the hypergraph correspond to the players, the edges
correspond to the ecient vectors (or to activities being performed by the players con-
cerned), and the preference of a vertex over the edges it is incident with comes from the
preference of the corresponding player over the activities he can be involved in. This is
called a hypergraphic preference system. A matching corresponds to a set of joint activ-
ities performed by certain coalitions that form a partition of the grandcoalition together
with the singletons (i.e. with the vertices not covered by the matching). A matching M
is stable if there exist no blocking edge, i.e. an edge e =2 M such that for every vertex
v covered by e, either v is unmatched in M or strictly prefers e to the edge that covers
v in M . The corresponding set of activities gives a stable outcome, since there exist no
blocking coalition with an activity that is strictly preferred by all of its members. Note
that dierent activities performed by the same players are represented by multiple edges in
the corresponding hypergraph. A hypergraph which represents the ecient utility vectors
of a cfg is simple (i.e, does not contain multiple edges and loops). 3
The notion of a fractional stable matching for an instance of sm for a hypergraph was
dened by Aharoni and Fleiner [1] as follows. A function x assigning non-negative weights
to edges of the hypergraph is called a fractional matching if
P
v2h x(h)  1 for every
vertex v. A fractional matching x is called stable if every edge e contains a vertex v such
that
P
v2h;evh x(h) = 1. The existence of a fractional stable matching can be veried
by Scarf's Lemma just like the existence of a fractional core element. Actually, these two
notions are basically equivalent.
To show the equivalence formally, we consider the polytope of intensity vectors fxjAx =
1N ; x  0g on the one hand, where A is the membership-matrix of the ecient utility vec-
tors (or the corresponding activities) of dimension n(n+m) as dened by Scarf's Lemma.
On the other hand, the fractional matching polytope is fxjBx  1N ; x  0g, where B
3We shall note that Aharoni and Fleiner [1] supposed in their model that the preferences of the players
are strict (i.e., no player is indierent between any pair of activities). In the literature on stable matching,
the setting where players may have ties in their lists is referred to as stable matching problem with ties.
In this case, a matching M is (weakly) stable if it does not admit a blocking edge (where the denition
of a blocking edge is the same as described above). However, an instance of sm with ties can be always
derived to another instance of sm (with no ties) by simply breaking the ties arbitrary, and a matching
that is stable for the derived instance is (weakly) stable for the original one. The same applies for the core
and fractional core in the context of NTU-games. In fact, the Scarf algorithm starts with a perturbation
of matrix C in the case that any player is indierent between two activities she may be involved in (i.e.,
when her utilities in these two activities are the same for her).
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is the vertex-edge incidence matrix of the hypergraph of dimension n  m. Therefore,
A = (InjB), so the dierence is only the n  n identity matrix, i.e. the membership-
matrix of the singletons. So, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between the
elements of the two polytopes: if xm is a fractional matching of dimension m, then let
xv = 1N Axm be a vector of dimension n, that gives the unlled intensities of the players
(or in other words, the intensities of the single activities). The direct sum of these two
independent vectors, x is an intensity vector of dimension n + m, and vice versa. The
stability condition is equivalent to the domination condition of Scarf's Lemma.
Aharoni and Fleiner [1] showed that a fractional stable matching can be assumed to be
an extremal point of the fractional matching polytope. This fact comes from a statement
similar to the following Proposition:
Proposition 6 If x is a fractional core element of a nitely generated NTU-game, and
x =
P
ix
i, where i > 0 for all i,
P
i = 1 and x
i satises the Axi = 1N and xi  0
conditions, then each xi must be a fractional core element.
The proof of this Proposition is straightforward, since supp(xi)  supp(x), that implies
the dominating property of the fractional core element.
Corollary 7 For any nitely generated NTU-game, there exists a fractional core element
that is an extremal point of the polytope fxjAx = 1N ; x  0g.
Corollary 7 implies that if, for a given nitely generated NTU-game, all the extremal
points of the above polytope are integers (or, in other words, the polytope has the integer
property) then the game has a nonempty core.
2.4 Normality implies the nonemptiness of the core
The denition of a normal hypergraph is due to Lovasz [32]. If H is a hypergraph and
H 0 is obtained from H by deleting edges, then H 0 is called a partial hypergraph of H.
The chromatic index e(H) of a hypergraph H is the least number of colours sucient
to colour the edges of H so that no two edges with the same colour have a vertex in
common. Note that the maximum degree, (H) (that is, the maximum number of edges
containing some one vertex) is a lower bound for the chromatic index. A hypergraph H
is normal if every partial hypergraph H 0 of H satises e(H 0) = (H 0). It is easy to
see that the normality is preserved by adding or deleting multiple edges or loops. The
following theorem of Lovasz [32] gives an equivalent description of normal hypergraphs.
Theorem 8 (Lovasz) The fractional matching polytope of a hypergraph H has the inte-
ger property if and only if H is normal.
Suppose that for a nitely generated NTU-game the set of essential coalitions forms a
normal hypergraph. The hypergraph of the corresponding sm must be also normal, since
it is obtained by adding multiple edges and by removing the loops. By Theorem 8, the
fractional matching polytope, fxjBx  1N ; x  0g has the integer property, and so has
the polytope of intensity vectors, fxjAx = 1N ; x  0g as it was discussed previously. This
argument and Corollary 7 verify the following Lemma 9.
Lemma 9 If, for a nitely generated NTU-game, the set of essential coalitions, E(N;V )
forms a normal hypergraph, then the core of the game is nonempty.
By Lemma 9 and Proposition 4 the following holds.
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Theorem 10 If the set of basic coalitions, B forms a normal hypergraph, then every
nitely generated NTU-game (N;V;B) has a nonempty core.
Let AB denote the membership-matrix of the set of basic coalitions B. The fact that the
integer property of the polytope fxjABx = 1N ; x  0g implies the nonemptiness of every
NTU-game (N;V;B) was proved rst by Vasin and Gurvich [44], and independently, by
Kaneko andWooders [26]. Later, Le Breton et al. [31], Kuipers [30] and Boros and Gurvich
[15] observed independently that the integer property of the polytope fxjABx = 1N ; x  0g
is equivalent to the integer property of the matching polytope fxjABx  1N ; x  0g, and
to the normality of the corresponding hypergraph.
We note that the converse of Theorem 10 is also true: Boros and Gurvich [15] proved
that if the set of basic coalitions, B has the property that the polytope fxjABx = 1N ; x 
0g has a non-integer extremal point (thus the corresponding hypergraph is not normal),
then there always exist a nitely generated NTU-game (N;V;B) with an empty core.
3 Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games
There are many economic and social situations where the agents may be involved in more
than one coalition at a time. A possible way to describe such situations is by capacitated
NTU-games.
3.1 Fractional b-core element
In what follows, we introduce the notion of fractional b-core element as a solution of
Scarf's Lemma with the original settings. Let the same matrices A and C of dimension
n  (n + m) correspond to the set of eective utility vectors (or activities) in a nitely
generated NTU-game as it was described in the previous section. The only modication
is that now b is an arbitrary vector of Rn+ (instead of 1N ). Let x 2 Rn+m+ be referred to
as a fractional b-core element if x is a solution of the Scarf Lemma for the above setting.
Here, b(i) is an upper bound for the total intensity at which player i is capable to
perform activities, since
P
i2S x(u
S;l) = b(i). The domination condition of the Lemma says
that for every activity aT;k, there exists some player i who is not interested in increasing
the intensity of aT;k, because his remaining intensity is lled with better activities, i.e., if
uT;k corresponds to activity aT;k, then
P
uS;li uT;ki
x(uS;l) = b(i).
In fact, to produce a fractional core element (in other words, a fractional 1N -core ele-
ment) with the algorithm of Scarf, we perturb not just matrix C (in case of indierences),
and also the right-hand side vector 1N , to avoid the degeneracy. The standard nondegen-
eracy assumption provides that all variables associated with the n columns of a feasible
basis for the equations A~x = ~b = 1N + "N are strictly positive. Thus, the perturbation
uniquely determines the steps of Scarf algorithm. By rounding the nal fractional ~b-core
element ~x, a fractional core element x is found. The following simple Lemma says that
the fractional b-core element has the scaling property.
Lemma 11 Given a nitely generated NTU-game, and a positive constant . Suppose
that b0 =   b, then x is a fractional b-core element if and only if x0 =   x is a fractional
b0-core element.
3.2 Fractional b-core element with capacities: stable allocation
Let us suppose that the intensities of the activities in the nitely generated NTU-game are
constrained by capacities. Formally, for each joint activity aS;l and for the corresponding
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utility vector uS;l, there may exist a nonnegative capacity c(uS;l) for which x(uS;l)  c(uS;l)
is required.
The stable allocation problem can be dened for hypergraphs as follows. Suppose that
we are given a hypergraph H and for each vertex v a strict preference order over the edges
incident with v (again, this corresponds to the preferences of the players over the activities
in which they can be involved). Suppose, that we are given nonnegative bounds on the
vertices b : V (H) ! R+ and nonnegative capacities on the edges c : E(H) ! R+. A
nonnegative function x on the edges, is an allocation if x(e)  c(e) for every edge e andP
v2h x(h)  b(v) for every vertex v. An allocation is stable if every unsaturated edge e
(i.e., every edge e with x(e) < c(e)) contains a vertex v such that
P
v2h;evh x(h) = b(v).
In this case we say that e is dominated at v. If every bound and capacity is integral then
we refer to this problem as the integral stable allocation problem.
Theorem 12 Every stable allocation problem for hypergraphs is solvable.
Proof: Suppose that we are given a given a hypergraph H. Let V (H) = fv1; v2; : : : ; vng
be the set of vertices and let E(H) = fe1; e2; : : : ; emg be the set of edges. We dene the
extended membership-matrix A, and the extended preference-matrix C of size (n+m)
(n+ 2m) as follows.
The left part of A is an identity matrix of size (n+m) (n+m), (i.e. ai;j = i;j for
i; j 2 [n +m]). At the bottom of the right side there is another identity matrix of size
mm, so an+i;n+m+j = i;j for i; j 2 [m]. Finally, at the top of the right side we have the
vertex-edge incidence matrix of H (i.e. ai;n+m+j = 1 if vi 2 ej and 0 otherwise for i 2 [n]
and j 2 [m]).
The top-right part of C correspond to the preference of the vertices (that is the pref-
erence of the players over the activities). We require the following two conditions:
 ci;n+m+j < ci;n+m+k whenever vi 2 ej \ ek and ej <vi ek;
 ci;n+m+j < ci;n+m+k whenever vi 2 ej n ek.
Furthermore, suppose that cn+i;n+m+i < cn+i;n+m+j for every i 6= j 2 [m] in the
bottom-right part of C. Finally, let the left part of C be such that it satises the conditions
of Scarf's Lemma. The constant vector, b 2 Rn+m+ is given by the bounds and capacities,
so let bi = b(vi) for i 2 [n] and bn+j = c(ej) for j 2 [m].
We shall prove that the fractional core element x, obtained by Scarf's Lemma, gives
a stable allocation, xe by simply taking the last m coordinates of x. Here, xej is equal to
xe(ej) that is the weight of the edge ej (or equivalently, this is the intensity at which the
corresponding activity is performed). If xv and xe are the vectors obtained by taking the
[1; : : : ; n] and [n + 1; : : : ; n + m] coordinates of x, then these vectors correspond to the
remaining weights of the vertices and edges (or the remaining intensities of the players
and the activities), respectively.
It is straightforward to see that xe is an allocation by Ax = b, since the rst n
equations preserve the
P
v2h x
e(h)  b(v) condition for every vertex v, and the last m
equations preserve xe(ej)  c(ej) for every edge ej .
To prove stability, let us consider an unsaturated edge ej and let us suppose that the
corresponding dominating row by the Lemma has index i. First we show, that i 2 [n].
From Ax = b, xe(ek) + x
e(ek) = c(ek) for every edge ek. Since x
e(ej) < c(ej), then
xe(ej) > 0, thus the assumptions on C imply that i 6= n+ j, for any other i 2 [n+m] n [n]
the contradiction is trivial. If i 2 [n] then ej is dominated at vi, since xv(vi) = 0 by the
assumptions on C, and the Ax = b condition for the i-th row together with the statement
of the Lemma imply that
P
vi2ek;ejviek x
e(ek) = b(vi).
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We illustrate the notion of stable allocation on a stable matching problem in Example
3 of the next section, where we also describe the matrices A and C of the Lemma.
3.3 Stable allocations with contributions
It is possible that the contributions of the participants are not equal in a cooperation.
Imagine an internal project of a company where the hours allocated to the employees
involved can be dierent (e.g., a quality manager may have less work load assigned than
an engineer in terms of working hours). We can model this extension easily for a stable
allocation problem, that we call stable allocation problem with contributions. We only need
to use contribution vectors here rather than membership vectors, as for the simple stable
allocation problem.
In addition to the denitions of the stable allocation problem, we introduce a contribu-
tion vector re : V (H)! R+ for each edge e of the hypergraph. We assume that v 2 e if and
only if re(v) > 0, that is when agent v contributes to contract e. A nonnegative function x
on the edges, is an allocation if x(e)  c(e) for every edge e andPv2e x(e)re(v)  b(v) for
every vertex v. An allocation is stable if every unsaturated edge e (i.e., every edge e with
x(e) < c(e)) contains a vertex v such that
P
v2f;evf x(f)rf (v) = b(v). If every bound,
capacity and contribution is integral then we refer to this problem as the integral stable
allocation problem with contributions.
Theorem 13 Every stable allocation problem with contributions is solvable.
The same proof technique works here as for Theorem 12 with the only dierence that
here we shall use contribution vectors instead of membership vectors when dening matrix
A in Scarf's Lemma. Therefore the proof is omitted.
If we restrict the solution of a stable allocation problem to take any contract with either
full or no intensity, i.e., x(e) = c(e) or x(e) = 0, then we can create a corresponding stable
allocation problem, where each contract has capacity one, and the allocation is binary.
This can be done simply by multiplying each agents contribution in contract e by c(e).
We call the latter problem, binary stable allocation problem with unit edge-capacities, as
stable schedule problem.
To illustrate the meaning of this model, let us describe a motivating example. In a
department there are dierent activities, involving students and teachers. A lecture is an
activity that requires, say, 6 hours from the professor and 4 hours from each student per
week. The supervision of a PhD student is a 2-members activity that typically involves 4
hours supervision by the professor and 40 hours work by the student. A seminar is a one-
hour activity by the regular participants and probably 3 hours activity by the organiser.
A research project is a more complex activity that involves both professors and students
with dierent contributions and sub-activities. In this situation a schedule is a solution
with some activities performed with dierent contributions where no individual is over-
scheduled (i.e. her total contribution in the activities performed is less than or equal to her
capacity), and there is no available activity that could be realised, by possibly cancelling
some performed activity, such that each individual involved would be strictly better o.
Another interesting real-life problem that can be described by the stable schedule
problem is the project contribution system applied by the Hungarian Scientic Research
Fund and the French National Research Agency. In Hungary, the research proposal should
contain a declaration by each participants on her contribution time in the project, any
number between 0 and 1. A participant may be involved in any number of projects, but
the total contribution of a full-time researcher may not exceed 1, and cannot be more than
0.7 in case of lecturers. In France and Portugal, the systems are similar, the participants
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should declare what percentage of their research time they are willing to spend on each
particular project they are involved in. In the planning phase of these grant applications,
a researcher might reject to participate in a proposal if she has already used her total
contribution in other projects that she prefers.
At the end of the next section we will also describe the hospital residents problem
with couples, that can be modelled as a stable schedule problem, and the Scarf algorithm
appears to be an ecient heuristic for nding stable solutions in a centralised matching
scheme.
4 Matching games
Matching games can be dened as partitioning NTU-games, where the cardinality of each
basic coalition is at most 2. For simplicity, in this section we suppose that no player is
indierent between two ecient utility vectors, so their preferences over the joint activities
are strict. If a matching game is nitely generated, then the problem of nding an outcome
that is in the core is equivalent to a sm for a graphic preference system, where the edges
of the graph correspond to ecient utility vectors (and to joint activities).
4.1 Stable matching problem
If the graph of a matching game is simple (i.e, if it contains no multiple edges and loops)
then the problem of nding a core-partition for the resulting cfg is called stable roommates
problem. Otherwise, if the graph has multiple edges then we may refer to sm as stable
roommates problem with multiple activities.
Let us suppose the set of players N can be divided into two parts, say M and W ,
such that every two-member basic coalition contains one member from each side (so if
fm;wg 2 B then m 2M and w 2W ). In this case, we get a two-sided matching game (in
the general nonbipartite case the matching game is called one-sided).
If a two-sided matching game is nitely generated then the corresponding graphic
representation of the sm is bipartite. For bipartite graphs, the following Proposition is
well-known.
Proposition 14 Every bipartite graph is normal.
Proposition 14 and Theorem 10 imply the following result.
Theorem 15 (Kaneko [25], Crawford-Knoer [17]) Every nitely generated two-sided
matching game has a nonempty core.
Theorem 15 was proved for every two-sided matching game by Crawford and Knoer
[17] and Kaneko [25]. In the latter paper this game was called central assignment game.
For the corresponding cfg-s, called stable marriage problems, this result was proved by
Gale and Shapley [22]. The related TU-setting, the assignment game, was studied by
Shapley and Shubik [42].
A one-sided matching game can have an empty core, even for a cfg, as Gale and
Shapley [22] illustrated with an example. However the half-integer property of the frac-
tional matching polytope implies the existence of stable half-integer solutions. In partic-
ular, a half-core element is a fractional core element x with the half-integer property, i.e.
xi 2 f0; 12 ; 1g. The following statement is due to Balinski [6].
Theorem 16 (Balinski [6]) The fractional matching polytope for every graph has only
half-integer extremal points.
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As Aharoni and Fleiner [1] showed, Theorem 16 and Corollary 7 imply that for every
matching game there exists a half-core element.
Theorem 17 (Tan [43]) If a matching game is nitely generated then it always has a
half-core element.
For cfg-s, the fact that for every instance of sm there exists a stable half-matching
was proved by Tan [43]. Finally we note that an easy consequence of Theorem 16 and
Lemma 11 is that for every nitely generated matching game, there always exists an integer
2N -core element.
4.2 Stable allocation problem for graphs
The stable allocation problem was introduced by Baou and Balinski [5] for bipartite
graphs. The integer version, where the allocation x is required to be integer on every edge
for integer bounds and capacities, was called the stable schedule problem by Alkan and
Gale [2]. However, they considered a more general model, the case of so-called substitutable
preferences. We will discuss the dierences briey in the last Section.
Biro and Fleiner [8] generalised the algorithm of Baou and Balinski [5] for nonbipartite
graphs, resulting in a weakly polynomial algorithm that nds a half-integral stable allo-
cation for any given instance of integral stable allocation problem. Dean and Munshi [20]
strengthened this result by giving a strongly polynomial algorithm for the same problem.
However, as we will prove below, the existence of a stable half-integer allocation is an easy
consequence of Theorem 12.
Theorem 18 For every integral stable allocation problem in a graph there exists a half-
integral stable allocation. If the graph is bipartite, then every integral stable allocation
problem is solvable.
Proof: Suppose that we have a stable allocation x that has some weights that are not
half-integers. We create another stable allocation x0 with half-integer weights as follows. If
x(e) is not integer then let v be the vertex where e is dominated. Since b(v) is integer, there
must be another edge, f that is incident with v and has non-integer weight. Moreover, f
cannot be dominated at v. By this argument, it can be veried that the edges with non-
integer weights form vertex-disjoint cycles, moreover, in each such a cycle the fractional
parts of the weights are " and 1   " alternately. If a cycle is odd, then " must be 12 . If
a cycle is even, then " can be modied to be 0 (or 1) in such a way that the obtained
allocation x0 remains stable and has only half-integer weights.
If the graph is bipartite, thus has no odd cycle, then x0 has only integer weights, so x0
is an integral stable allocation .
We note that the scaling property holds also for the stable allocation problem. By this,
if every bound and capacity is even, then the existence of an integral stable allocation is
straightforward by Theorem 18.
Finally, we illustrate the integral stable allocation problem for a graph and show how
a half-integer stable allocation can be obtained by the Scarf algorithm.
Example 3.
We are given 6 agents and 7 possible pairwise activities. The bounds of the agents are:
b(a1) = 4, b(a2) = 1, b(a3) = 1, b(a4) = 2, b(a5) = 2 and b(a6) = 4. The capacities of the
possible activities are: c(fa1; a2g) = 1, c(fa1; a3g) = 2, c(fa1; a5g) = 2, c(fa1; a6g) = 3,
c(fa2; a5g) = 1, c(fa3; a6g) = 2 and c(fa4; a6g) = 1. The preference lists of the agents are
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the following:
a1
a3
a6
a4
a5
a2
4
3
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
2 1 1
1
Players Preference lists
a1 : a6 a3 a2 a5
a2 : a5 a1
a3 : a6 a1
a4 : a6
a5 : a1 a2
a6 : a4 a3 a1
The extended membership-matrix A is:
A =
2666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
                                       
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3777777777777777777777777777775
Matrix C, that represents the preference of the players, can be generated as follows:
C =
2666666666666666666666666666664
0 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 3 4 2 5 8 7 6
25 0 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 4 11 10 9 5 7 6
25 24 0 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 4 10 9 8 5 6
25 24 23 0 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 5
25 24 23 22 0 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 5 9 4 7 6
25 24 23 22 21 0 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 3 8 4 5
                                       
25 24 23 22 21 20 0 18 17 16 15 14 13 1 11 10 9 8 7 6
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 0 17 16 15 14 13 12 1 10 9 8 7 6
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 0 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 9 8 7 6
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 0 15 14 13 12 11 10 1 8 7 6
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 0 14 13 12 11 10 9 1 7 6
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 0 13 12 11 10 9 8 1 6
25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 0 12 11 10 9 8 7 1
3777777777777777777777777777775
In the algorithm, we used the following perturbation on b: we set ~bi = bi + "i =
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bi + 1=p101 i, where pi is the i-th prime number. By rounding the output ~x of the Scarf
algorithm, we get the following fractional b-core element x, and stable allocation xe:
a1
a3
a6 a5
a2a4
3
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
x = [xvjxejxe], where xe = [1
2
; 0;
3
2
; 2;
1
2
; 1; 1]
xv = [0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0] and xe = [
1
2
; 2;
1
2
; 1;
1
2
; 1; 0]
In the above gure, we oriented each unsaturated edge to its endvertex, where it is
dominated.
4.3 Stable allocation problems with contributions
Dean and Swar [19] showed that the extension of the Dean-Munshi [20] algorithm can
solve the stable allocation problem with contributions for bipartite graphs, called as the
generalized stable allocation problem, in strongly polynomial time. A particular integral
version was studied by Dean et al. [18] and by Manlove and McDermid [33]. Here, the
items on one side, say jobs, have sizes and they should be allocated with machines with
capacities. This is a particular setting since each job has the same size with regard to all
machines. Dean et al. [18] called the problem unsplittable stable marriage problem and
they showed that a stable solution always exists if the quotas can be violated by the largest
size of any job. Manlove and McDermid dened the stable marriage problem with sizes in
a similar way, but they considered the capacities of the machines to be rigid. They showed
that the problem of nding a stable solution is NP-hard, even if jobs have sizes of 1 and
2 only, a case which is also known as a special setting of the hospital residents problem
with couples (see more details about this problem in the next section).
4.4 The hospitals residents problem with couples
Strictly speaking this problem does not fell into the category of matching games, as it
concerns coalitions of size three, involving a couple (formed by two residents) and a pair
of hospitals where the couple is seeking positions. The US resident allocation program, now
called National Resident Matching Program, has been using the Gale-Shapley algorithm
[22] to allocate junior doctors to hospitals since 1952, see details in [36]. However, the
coordinators of the scheme realised that married couples tend not to participate in the
program, typically in order to avoid getting assigned to hospital geographically far from
each other. Therefore the scheme has been redesigned in the late nineties by Roth and
Peranson, as described in [37].
Unfortunately stable solution may not exist any more in this setting [36], and the
problem of nding one is NP-hard [35]. Therefore heuristics are used in all the real
applications. Biro et al. [11] compared some heuristics used in the American and Scottish
applications, called NRMP and SFAS respectively. In our follow-up paper [10] we showed
how we can reduce this problem to a stable schedule problem (i.e. binary integral stable
allocation problem with contributions). Therefore, we can use the Scarf algorithm as a
new heuristic to nd stable solutions.
To illustrate the usage of the Scarf algorithm, here we include the description of an
experiment described in our follow-up paper [10]. We implemented and tested this method
and compared its performance with the two algorithms that are used in NRMP [37] and
in SFAS [11]. The results of a particular experiment for same random samples used in [11]
are shown in Table 1.
In this computational experiment, there were 500 residents and the proportion of
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Number of couples
Algorithm 12 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
R{P (1999) 952 897 701 547 395 277 170 83 41 9 3
B{I{S (2011) 976 958 911 870 811 752 682 546 281 71 10
Scarf by B{F{I (2013) 895 813 649 532 426 356 316 261 202 174 158
Table 1: Randomly created matching markets with couples for 500 residents.
couples varied from 5% to 100%. For each proportion of couples, 1000 random instances
were generated and we counted how many instances each variant could solve. The table
shows that the heuristics due to [11] obtained a much better success ratio than the Roth-
Peranson heuristics, especially for high proportions of couples. But surprisingly, the Scarf-
algorithm was even much better than the others when (almost) all the applicants form
couples. Note that a similar situation occurs in another applications, the Hungarian higher
education matching scheme [46], where applicants may apply for pairs of teacher's studies
(e.g. to become a teacher in maths and physics). More details on this experiment can be
found in [10].
Finally, we note that in the case when each hospital has one place only, we get an
NTU-game (which is almost a coalition formation game, except that a couple can apply
to a pair of hospitals in two possible ways). If the hospitals have capacities, but no couple
may apply for a pair of positions in the same hospital, then the problem can be reduced
to the integral stable allocation problem, where the stable matchings corresponds to the
integral stable allocations. However, if a couple can submit combined applications for
a pair of positions in the same hospital, then we shall use contributions. A combined
application can be described as a contract where the contributions of the couple is 1 and
the contribution of the hospital is 2. As we prove in [10], this most general version of the
hospital residents problem with couples can be reduced to the stable schedule problem,
although here the correspondence hold only in one direction, a stable schedule translates
to a stable matching of the original problem, but not the other way. Nevertheless, the
Scarf algorithm can be used as a heuristic to solve this problem as well, whenever the
algorithm returns an integral solution, we found a stable matching.
5 Further notes
The meaning of stability. In our stability denition we implicitly suppose that the
deviating coalition may keep all of their existing cooperations with both the members of the
deviating coalition and the outsiders. This restriction is not always realistic, and therefore
considering alternative denitions of blocking coalitions and corresponding alternative
stability concepts is a natural question to investigate. In fact, this approach has been
already studied for TU-games with overlapping coalitions [16] (subsection 5.2), where
three core denitions have been provided. As it is described in detail in [16] (subsection
8.2), the concept of fuzzy games (see e.g. Aubin [4]) is similar in nature to TU games with
overlapping coalitions, but not quite the same.
In our models, the agents have linear preferences over the possible contracts, which
means that their preferences over the set of contracts are responsive and thus also sub-
stitutable (see e.g. [36]). This is obviously not always the case in real markets, where
complementarities can exist. Furthermore, the choice function of the agents over the sets
of fractional contracts is also very restricted by our denition. For instance, our stability
condition implies that if a resident was asked to choose between two half-time jobs and
one full time job at the worse hospital then she would always choose the two half-time
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jobs. This is not always a realistic assumption in practical applications.
Guarantees for solvability. The original goal of Scarf [40] was to give a necessary
condition for the nonemptiness of the core for general NTU-games (and this condition was
the balancedness of the game). As we described in Section 3, if the coalition structure of
an NTU-game can be represented with a normal hypergraph then the core of the game is
always nonempty (regardless of the players' preferences). The bipartite graph is an easy
example for normal hypergraphs, and so every two-sided matching game has nonempty
core. But what other games have this property? Our claim is that certain network games
also have a coalition structure where the underlying hypergraph is normal. Another way
of guaranteing solvability of NTU-games can be to make assumptions on the players'
preferences.
Understanding Scarf's results. Scarf proved his Lemma in an algorithmic way. Is there
some deeper reasons for the correctness of the Lemma (and a more general interpretation
of the algorithm)? What is the relation of this result to other fundamental theorems, such
as the Sperner Theorem? There are some recent papers [1, 28, 21] attempting to answer
this question, but yet, there still are many open problems regarding this issue.
Also, it would be interesting to know how the Scarf algorithm works for special games.
For instance, does the Scarf algorithm run in polynomial time for matching games?
At the beginning of the Scarf algorithm we perturb matrix C and vector b. By doing
so, the steps in the algorithm and the nal output are fully determined. Can we output
every core element of a given NTU-game by using a suitable perturbation? How does the
perturbation eect the solution, we obtain by the algorithm? For stable marriage problem
we observed that using small epsilons for men and larger epsilons for women we always
get the man-optimal stable matching. Can we output each stable matching by a suitable
perturbation? Is that true that the smaller epsilon we give to a woman the better partner
she is going to get in the resulting stable matching? Is a similar statement true for general
NTU-games?
Further theoretical applications. In this paper we demonstrated the usage of Scarf
Lemma in stable matching theory. However, there are still many related open questions.
For instance, the stable matching problem with contributions has not been studied yet to
the best of our knowledge (only some special cases, such as the hospitals residents problem
with couples). A natural question is whether can we nd a stable integral allocation in
polynomial time for two-sided or one-sided matching games with contributions?
Furthermore, there can be other family of NTU-games where the concept of stable
allocations may be worth to study, e.g. network games.
Practical applications. The problem of nding a core element for an NTU-game can
be NP-hard for some family of games or stable matching problems, but we may well need
to solve such problems in practical applications. In section 4, we illustrated how the Scarf
algorithm can be used as a heuristic to solve the hospitals residents problem (detailed
descriptions on our experiments are given in our follow-up paper [10]). This suggests that
perhaps the same technique can be used in other applications as well.
A further example for practical applications, where the underlying problem is NP-
hard and where the Scarf algorithm could be potentially used as a heuristic, is the kidney
exchange problem with bounded length exchange cycles. Centralised programs for organ-
ising exchanges among incompatible patient-donor pairs have been established in several
countries, such as the US, UK, Netherlands, etc. Stable exchanges as solution concept for
this application have been suggested by Roth et al. [39]. However, as Biro and McDermid
showed [13], if the length of the exchange cycles is bounded to be at most three (as it is
the case in all of the above mentioned applications), a stable solution might not exist and
the problem of nding a stable exchange is NP-complete.
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Note that the usage of the Scarf algorithm is similar to the usage of LP-relaxations in
solving integer programming problems. The latter techniques proved to be very ecient in
practice in the last decades, and so we believe that the Scarf algorithm will also be found
useful with regard to this aspect, too. As an example, we can mention a very recent paper
[34] where the authors prove that in certain settings the existence of a stable integral
solution can be guaranteed for slightly adjusted quotas by rounding a fractional stable
solution of the original instance.
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